The problem of Islamic fundamentalism ironically, had never appeared so threatening as it started to appear after the September 11 attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York. And never before any state had responded on such a massive footing to any terrorist strike, as did the United States. Today there's hardly any part of the world which is not hit by acts of terrorism and the menace continues to widen its area of influence. But the September 11 strikes could be considered a historical landmark in at least one way. Never before any single terrorist attack has produced such serious after shocks in three different states. The tremors of the aircrafts crashing into the WTC and the Pentagon were felt instantly in the US and then subsequently in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pearl Harbour of the 21st century, the September 11 episode is capable of changing the course of history because the ensuing struggle against terrorism has an ideological, religious, economical and political motive.

Apart from the US and Afghanistan, the country which was forced to become a party to the conflict is Pakistan. The retaliatory strikes launched by the US and its allies have not only uprooted the Taliban from all of their strongholds in Afghanistan, but also forced several critical policy changes on several issues in Pakistan. One such issue which has raised concerns worldwide is the issue of Islamic fundamentalism and Pakistan's role in it. In the past, Pakistan faced severe criticism from the US and the international community, for its links with numerous jehadi outfits involved in terrorist activities in India and Afghanistan. Those criticism now having a substantive basis, have forced the US to put pressure on Pakistan to reconsider its role in Islamic fundamentalism and cooperate in the fight against terrorism. This article looks at dilemmas, constraints and opportunities which Pakistan's president Pervez Musharraf faces in tackling the issue.

Operation Enduring Freedom, as the strikes were philosophically code named, have opened up two fronts for Musharraf, one across the Durand line and the other within Pakistan. Although it is still early days to portray a complete picture of any regime which would shape Afghanistan's future, yet this much is certain that it would not be a Pakistan friendly one. This is an important factor which would cast shadows on Musharraf's foreign policy decisions. Unlike before, Pakistan apart from its vigil on the Indo-Pakistan border, will also have to watch its western frontiers. To make matters worse, New Delhi has already sent its emissary to establish initial diplomatic contacts with the post-Taliban Afghanistan. The recent visit of Abdullah Abdullah, the foreign minister of the interim regime of Afghanistan, to India, would lay the foundation of a long-term relationship much to the discomfort of Pakistan. A warm relationship between India and non-Pakistan friendly Afghanistan, would complicate Pakistan's present strategic compulsion and force significant shifts in its foreign and domestic policies.

On the domestic front, the most pressing concern for Musharraf is dealing with the fundamentalist groups, who have protested on the streets in large numbers against his decision to support the US led strikes on Afghanistan. While the US and its allies bombarded the strongholds of Taliban, Musharraf was busy suppressing violent demonstrations of the radical and fundamentalist groups on the streets, all over Pakistan. Widespread unrest from religious groups swept the country in the wake of his pledge for "full cooperation" with the US strikes. The seriousness of the situation could be gauged from the fact that nervous western embassy officials started sending their family and non-essential staff out of Pakistan. Thousands of radical seminary students thronged the streets of Peshawar and Karachi and shouted anti-Musharraf and anti-US slogans. The Pakistan Ulema Council (PUC), Pakistan's top mainstream religious body issued a fatwa saying, "It is the duty of all the Muslims to in the world to protect Muslim countries and Muslims, and the people of Pakistan and ulema (Islamic scholars) will not let America destroy the interests and identity of Pakistan and Afghanistan." The confrontation between the protestors and the security personnel left hundreds seriously injured, and a large number arrested.

More than 3,000 angry demonstrators initiated a march from the Madni mosque in Peshwar, 100 kilometers far from the Durand line in support of the Taliban regime. Slogans like "Long Live Taliban", "Long live Osama", and "Friends of the US are the enemies of Islam" echoed across the city. The pro-Taliban Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) party insisted on Musharraf to withdraw Pakistan's support for the strikes. The apex hardline radical Islamic party, the Jamiat-i-Islami (JI) held an infuriated protest near the Afghan border and its supporters fired AK-47 assault rifles shots, shouting "America's army will find its grave in Pakistan and Afghanistan" and anti-Musharraf slogans. Similar scenes were witnessed in Karachi.

This is not the first time that the fundamentalist groups have defied government's decisions. During Prime Minister Vajpayee's historic bus trip to Lahore in 1999, the fundamentalist groups led by the parent organistaion, the Jamaat-i-Islami had critised the Sharif government, protested on the streets and opposed the Lahore Declaration. Later that year, during the Kargil war, the right wing Islamic organizations had called Sharif a 'traitor' and vehemently condemned his decision, taken on the behest of Washington, to pullout the Pakistani troops from Kargil. Munawwar Hussain, secretary general of Jamaat-I-Islami had warned, "The nation will not forgive Sharif for selling out on Kargil, warned, which is closely linked with Islamic militant groups fighting in Kashmir. Syed Salahuddin, chief of the United Jehad Council had declared, "We will not put our guns down. We will continue to fight till the last drop of our blood".

Why did Musharraf so quickly decide to support the US led strikes and crackdown on the protestors and alienate the large fundamentalist population of the country? One obvious reason was to convince the west of his intentions to transform Pakistan into a moderate and liberal Islamic state. Besides, Musharraf's gamble to support the US won Pakistan instant economic favours. It received $ 2.5 billion economic aid and debt relief, in addition to lifting of sanctions that were imposed on it, in the wake of nuclear tests in 1999. In Musharraf's calculations Pakistan's need to get rid of the sanctions and receive the much needed financial assistance, outweighed the threat posed by the agitating fundamentalists groups to the security of Pakistan. However, if Musharraf's gamble to prefer economic aid over unrest in the backyard would benefit him in the wrong run is yet to be seen, but he certainly cannot afford to be complacent to the threat posed by the fundamentalist groups and their jehadi cadres, to the stability of Pakistan.

In Spring 2001, a report of the U.S. State Department said that South Asia has replaced the Middle East as the bastion of terrorist activities. The report also spoke of Pakistan promoting militancy in the name of jehad to confuse the West and General Pervez Musharraf's, labeling militants involved in these activities as "freedom fighters". Most of these militants were operating in the "India held Kashmir", the reports said. Reflecting on the Pakistani role, the report said it is assisting the militants' passage into "Indian-held Kashmir", funding, training, and equipping the irregulars (recruits from outside Pakistani military).

But has Pakistan always been naïve of the threats of fundamentalist to its own society? No. Over the past decade or so, some realization has taken roots that if the militants have helped its game plan of internationalizing the Kashmir issue, they have also brought disrepute to the country. In fact, at one time it was very close to being declared a terrorist state by the US. Pakistan has realized that its policy of promoting terrorist activities (read jihad) in Kashmir to draw diplomatic and political mileage internationally, has produced little dividends. Instead, it has created bands of rival militant groups within Pakistan, who have indulged in internecine and sectarian clashes to justify their respective narrow versions of Islam.

It is a great irony that the scourge of Islamic fundamentalism has done more damage to the social and religious fabric of Islamic Pakistan, than it has to a secular India. In its 2000 report, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) estimated that 109 incidents of bomb blasts killed 149 people in the country. Though the HRCP report attributed only 69 deaths to sectarian violence, it is estimated that the actual casualty figures could be much higher. The report also found that more attacks occurred on mass gatherings in rival mosques and several assassinations of prominent leaders from rival sectarian groups took place, since Musharraf's ascendance to power.

The Institute of Conflict Management (ICM), New Delhi's Pakistan Assessment 2000, mentions that a Pakistani press report, on the basis of an unnamed study, quoted 37 explosions in 13 cities from January 1 to November 6, 2000, killing 81 and injuring 313 persons. Another press report, conducting a comparative analysis of the last 12 months of the civil and democratic regime of Nawaz Sharif and the first 12 months of the military regime of Pervez Musharraf, showed 14 bomb attacks in the former regime as compared to 27 in the latter. The number of casualties for the two regimes during that period remained at 36 and 59, respectively. In contrast to HRCP's 2000 report, some studies suggested that there was a decline for many months in killings since Musharraf came to power. This should not be construed as an effectiveness of the military regime, but rather the fundamentalist groups maintaining a low profile and adopting a wait and watch approach.

Today Pakistan is paying a heavy social and political price and has become a victim of the tiger it rode for more than a decade. Musharraf is finding it extremely difficult to control the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan. The Jehadis that were created to further Pakistan's Kashmir policy have begun to fight among themselves for a political space and recognition, within Pakistan. India. Rise in the number of fundamentalists groups in Pakistan such as Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hizb-ul Mujahideen, Al-Badr, Hartka-ul Jehadi Islami, Hizb-ul Momineen, Tehrik-ul Mujahideen among others is responsible for increasing sectarian and internecine clashes in Pakistan. It is only in Pakistan and to an extent in Chechnya that militants Islamists use their own territory to train Islamic militants for jihad. Other countries which promote terrorist activities relied on Osama bin Laden's Al Qaida outfit for training, shelter and money.

Most of the Pakistan sponsored terrorist camps have been based in the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), to belie all charges of running such activities from its soil. But the relationship between Pakistan and PoK is an open book and Pakistan knows it well. That is why sensing US' serious intentions of demolishing terrorist camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan issued immediate orders to temporarily close over 10 training camps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). According to intelligence sources, as many as 12 training camps run by Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Jehadi Islami, Tekreek-e-Jehadi-Islami, Harkat- ul-Mujahideen, Muslim Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Mohammad have been shut down temporarily. The dispersed militants were immediately sent to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, later to join their brethren in Afghanistan facing the American onslaught. It is believed that Pakistan based Lashker-e-Toiba (LeT) had sent its top 500 militants to Afghanistan to fight for Taliban.

In March 2000, first signs of Musharraf's firm resolve to tame the fundamentalists began to surface, as a ban on public display of weapons was imposed. The Interior Minister Moinuddin Haider declared that all militant Islamic groups were ordered to "behave and not make irresponsible and baseless statements" and refrain from organizing rallies. In July, in order to provide teeth to the anti-terrorism drive, the Minister announced federal authorities' plans to check sectarian feud and set up anti-terrorism cells in all provinces.

A few weeks before September 11, Musharraf banned two extremist religious parties and warned two others of punitive actions if they did not comply with the federal directives. In Sind strict orders were issued to all jehadi groups not to advertise or publicly collect contributions from their activists in Kashmir. Qazi Hussain Ahmed of the Jamait-e-Islami, Maulana Azam Tariq of the Sipha-e-Sahaba, Maulana Fazalur Rehman of the Jamiat Ulema Islam, and others like Maulana Sufi Mohammad and Liaqat Baloch, who openly mobilized hundreds of Pakistanis to fight for the Taliban have been arrested or put under house arrest. The immediate reaction - a group of 24 Islamic parties forming a joint Pakistan Afghan Defence Council (PADC) to wage a struggle against Musharraf and the interim regime of Afghanistan led by Hamid Karzai. Very soon, experts believe, there will be massive agitations to press for the formation of an independent Pakhtoonistan and a greater Baluchistan.

Jamiat Ulema Islam's secretary-general, Riyaz Durrani comments, ''Under pressure from the US, Musharraf is trying to put Kashmir on the backburner. We will not allow this to happen. Musharraf has made himself president for life. He will soon be a president without any life.'' In the past JUI was hand in glove with the army and ISI, but this nexus has been terminated by Musharraf and all kinds of support to the fundamentalist organizations ceased.

''He has no legitimate mandate to rule. Once our cadre takes to the streets, no military government will be able to stand up against us", reacts angrily Munawar Hasan, in-charge of JUI in Rehman's absence. The orphaned fundamentalist groups and clerics are fuming with rage and looking for an opportunity to overthrow Musharraf. Najam Sethi, editor of Friday Times observes that after facing stern actions in Pakistan, the recent attempt of the terrorists to barge into the Indian Parliament was meant to arouse the Indian leadership to act against Musharraf. The terrorists hope for a punitive response from India against Pakistan, which they could manipulate to their advantage in toppling Musharraf.

Last year, the chief of SSP at a convention, issued a programme of enforcement (their own interpretation of Islam), to be followed across twenty cities of Pakistan. In another such convention organized by HuM, Maulana Samiul Haq, a Pakistani parliamentarian called upon all the madrassas to prepare for an Islamic revolution or jihad. In December 2000, in a blatant defiance of the government's authority, Tanzeem-ul-Ikhwan, a sectarian group, threatened to hold a massive march in the capital city of Islamabad, in support of their demand for enforcing Islamic Sharia law.

Unfortunately, there exists a difference in the understanding of the entire issue of fundamentalism, among the present leaders of Pakistan, which means Musharraf has to make that extra effort to first develop a consensus among his leaders. In October 2000, in contrast to Musharraf's justification of jehad as a 'tolerant concept', Interior minister Moinuddin Haider, while speaking at a seminar in Karachi, cautioned the participants of the dangers, jehadis posed to Pakistan's stability and security. He presented a scenario of jehadis, mainly Lashkar-e-Taiba militants, returning from Kashmir to Pakistan, after accomplishing their mission and destabilizing Pakistan's already fragile and sensitive sectarian composition.

This scenario now appears all the more complex and dangerous for Pakistan after Operation Enduring Freedom has uprooted the Taliban regime and forced its fighters to flee in all directions. Having nowhere to run, these defeated warriors at some point certainly attempt to sneak into Pakistan for two simple reasons - first, to seek shelter among its extremists and fundamentalist supporters and second, to avenge the betrayal by Pervez Musharraf. The pressure of refugees and fugitive Taliban militia has already begun to mount on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Intelligence reports indicate that hard-line Taliban and Al Qaida fighters are moving into Pakistan's tribal border territories over which the federal government has limited control. Experts believe that this move has been made at the behest of Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar, who has ordered the fighters to withdraw from the cities and wage a prolonged guerilla battle against the anti-Taliban forces. If these fighters somehow manage to enter Pakistan and carry out anti-US activities from there, it will annoy the US and this time Pakistan will have to directly face the ire of the US.

The complexity of the situation for Pakistan can be understood by the fact that Pakistan now on one hand has to deal with government in Kabul, which is certainly not Pakistan friendly, if not anti-Pakistan and on the other be wary of the wrath of the Taliban, bent upon to avenge the betrayal. The composition of the interim regime set up in Afghanistan is not to Pakistan's liking and this would also fan religious militancy and fundamentalism in Pakistan, especially in the Pashtoon dominated tribal areas.

For Musharraf the challenge is to strike a balance between his pro-jehad policies and the vision of a moderate and liberal Pakistan. Jessica Stern, lecturer in Public Policy at John F Kennedy School at Harvard University, in her much talked about article, Pakistan's Jihad Culture, (Foreign Affairs, November-December 2000) quite aptly described Pakistan's tight rope walk. She wrote:

Pakistan now faces a typical "principal-agent" problem: the interests of state (principal) and those of the militant groups (the agent) are not fully aligned. … the militant groups that Pakistan supports and Sunni sectarian killers(-) that Pakistan claims it wants to wipe out(-) overlap significantly. By facilitating the actions of irregulars in Kashmir, the Pakistani government is inadvertently promoting sectarianism, supporting international terrorists, weakening the prospects for peace in Kashmir, damaging Pakistan's international image, spreading a narrow and violent version of Islam throughout the region, and increasing tensions with India - all against the interests of Pakistan as a whole.

After coming under gory attack, the US will now no more turn a nelson eye to Pakistan's open and active supports to terrorist groups such as Hizb-ul Mujahiden, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba and other guerilla outfits. The defeat of the Taliban at the hands of the US (read the West) has considerably hurt the sentiments and self-esteem of almost all the Islamic fundamentalist groups, who see this fight as a West versus Islam. The wounds which they have sustained at the hands of the US will take long to heal and a charmer like Osama bin Laden and other jehadi leaders would try to use this to their advantage. In such a situation the US would like to ensure that no terrorist groups are nurtured in and by Pakistan even if they limit their activities to Kashmir.

Whether Pakistan would be able put the fundamentalists on leash under the US pressure is a yet to be seen, but history tells that Pakistan's record in controlling the fanatics is dismal. Though the social clout of the fundamentalists is enormous, their political following is weak. They have never secured more than five percent of the votes in any national election, and have never had strength of more than half-a-dozen Member of National Assembly (MNA's) at any occasion. What makes them a force to reckon with is their street power and their ability to mobilise people in thousands on a single clarion call. This time an again baffled the establishment, analysts and the civil society.

As the new security and strategic takes shape, it would be interesting to see, how Pakistan continues to use the terrorist groups only in Kashmir, ensuring that they are not hand in glove with the Taliban and other jehadi groups against the West and US in particular. Apart from dealing with the fundamentalist, sectarian groups, and thousand of madarssas (reports quote their strengths around 50,000), Musharraf also has to keep a watch on a small but significant section of the top Army brass and the officer corps who sympathise with the cause of the jehadi groups. He will have to keep his own GHO in Rawalpindi, and other corps headquarters across the country in complete confidence.

The poor performance of the Pakistani leaders against the fundamentalists does not mean that Musharraf also falls in that category. He has taken a few thoughtful initiatives which might have some bearing on his anti-fundamentalism drive. In an interview, at the beginning of 2001, Musharraf had accepted that 'generations of young men who have no real world options, job opportunities and vocational skills, are perfect soldiers for the radical and fundamentalist groups'. To empower such young people with skills and education, Musharraf has rightly prepared a curriculum for the Madarssas which apart from Islamic teachings, would also include computer and vocational education. This would mean that after completing their education, the students would have several options and treading on the path of fanaticism, as a saviour of Islam would no longer be a compulsion. Although, merely educating the youth as a panacea for Pakistan's perennial problem of fundamentalism would not suffice, yet it would an effective tool in undermining the base of the jehadi and sectarian groups.

The threat of jehadis has assumed such dangerous proportions that fears of them taking over a nuclear installation has also been discussed been raised by experts. If not so, at least fissile material and crude nuclear weapons being smuggled to the jehadis cannot be ruled out. The arrest of three Pakistani nuclear scientists, reportedly working for the Taliban, and later handed over to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), strengthens the latter possibility. Sultan Bashiruddin Mehmood, a co-accused, was allegedly trying to make a bomb for the Taliban, using smuggled weapon grade fissile material from Russia and Central Asian states.

Pakistan's poor record in dealing with fundamentalists and their inability in monitoring their movements has compelled the US to assist the former with its intelligence information and personnel as well. It has already deployed officials to keep a watch on the rapidly changing security dimensions of the region. Musharraf is also under enormous pressure from the US to tame the radical elements in its intelligence agencies, clamp down on fundamentalist and fanatic institutions propagating a distorted version of jehad. The US is particularly unhappy over the fact that the fundamentalists are carrying out their activities, at the expense of the economic aid provided by it in lieu of Pakistan's cooperation in Operation Enduring Freedom.

CIA Director George Tenet's visit to Pakistan in November, was specifically scheduled to insist on Islamabad to initiate policy changes, including those concerning Kashmir. Tenet's visit also provided a boost to the present US-Pakistan joint efforts to monitor extremist groups and their activities. It is reported that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officials have been sprung into action and deployed at strategic locations such as major Pakistani airports and vital installations to intercept suspected jehadis and terrorists.

The current drive has already started paying dividends as the movement of suspected jehadi elements out of Pakistan is now being significantly curtailed. Fortunately, for Pakistan, this time dealing with the fundamentalist groups and militants, with the US intelligence officials, security personnel and financial support on its side, it would be relatively easier. Now whether Pakistan grabs this opportunity to pin down the all the jehadi groups or prefers to nurture some for its Kashmir policy, only time will tell. Nevertheless, this is certain that if the presence of the US personnel would help Pakistan deal with the jehadis, it may also work as a deterrent against its dual policy of using some jehadi groups against India. The siege laid down by the jehadis has taken deep roots in Pakistan and containing them would take eternity, let alone eliminating them.